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On Justice as Dance 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This article is part of a larger project that explores how to channel people’s passion for popular 
arts into legal social justice, by reconceiving law as a kind of poetry and justice as dance, and 
exploring different possible relationships between said legal poetry and dancing justice. I begin 
by rehearsing my previous new conception of social justice as organismic empowerment, and my 
interpretive method of dancing-with. I then apply this method to the following four “ethico-
political choreographies of justice”: (1) the choral dance of souls qua winged chariot-teams 
(from Plato); (2) a dancingly beautiful friendship with the community (from Aristotle); (3) a 
tightrope-dance of the cool (from Alfarabi); and (4) humans dancingly reimagined as positioned 
actors in fluidly moving groups (from Iris Marion Young). I then synthesize these analyses into 
“dancing justice,” defined as the dynamic equilibrium sustained by a critical mass of a 
community’s members comporting themselves like social dancers. 
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Whether on the streets, in the classroom, or on the internet, one frequently today observes 
conflicts between partisans of justice (who tend to lean center-left politically) and those of social 
justice (who tend to lean further left). By this opposition, I mean something like a milder version 
of the traditional struggle between liberal reformers and leftist revolutionaries, the former 
advocating gradual change from inside existing institutions, and the latter preferring sudden 
transformation from the outside.1 It might be helpful to introduce some tentative, working 
definitions of these terms (to be superseded later). Justice is rendering each person their due, 
relative to various hierarchies of ideas, people and things. Social justice consists of urgent repairs for 
inequities to sub-communities undermined by community hierarchy. And atomized (as opposed 
to social) justice is composed of unified systems aiming to slowly raise the average member’s 
receipt of their due.  
 
1 The long history of leftist scorn for the concept of justice includes J. S. Mill’s claim that justice is merely disguised 
vengeance, the Marxist view that justice is merely an ideological construct of the superstructure that perpetuates 
bourgeois norms of exploitation, and Charles Mills’ quotation of the African American folk saying that “When white 
people say ‘Justice,’ then mean ‘just us’.”  
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This opposition between justice and social justice is exacerbated by mainstream 
sociopolitical philosophy, which ever since the Enlightenment, questions of law and justice are 
framed almost exclusively in terms of contracts and scientific inquiry, most famously perhaps in 
the work of John Rawls.2 One problem with this methodological approach is that various other 
phenomena and forms of inquiry are marginalized, including the popular arts, thereby 
discouraging the participation of those for whom the popular arts are vital. For example, many 
(especially nonwhite and queer) young people’s attitudes toward legal justice today range from 
indifference to active hostility. Yet they remain passionate about popular arts and the often-
amorphous concept of social justice, as pervasively satirized by far-right social media users, who 
coined the phrase “social justice warrior” (or “SJW”) to mock leftist users whose activism seems 
restricted to the safety of the virtual world. Meanwhile, the real world remains unchanged, at 
least at the level of the kind of sustainable change uniquely afforded by the stability and 
permanence of legal justice. 
This situation creates both a problem and an opportunity. To wit, how can we get people 
to care about law and legal justice like they already care about the popular arts and social justice? 
One answer is provided by the larger project to which the present article belongs, a new 
conception of law as poetry, of justice as dance, and of the possible new relationships between 
such poetry-law and justice-dance.3 The present article focuses exclusively on justice as dance, 
proposing a revival of multiple powerful conceptions of justice from the history of philosophy 
that are sufficiently compatible with the popular arts to capture the enthusiasm of young people 
who would otherwise reserve their energies for extralegal social justice, or fail to engage in any 
 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999). 
3 See Joshua M. Hall, “On Law as Poetry: Shelley and Tocqueville,” South African Journal of Philosophy 40(3): 2021. 
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progressive social change whatsoever. The unifying feature of these conceptions, as captured in 
Agnes Heller’s term, “ethico-political conceptions of justice,” is that they conceive of justice as 
no less ethical than political—a virtue possessed by individuals no less than by societies.4 From 
their ethical half, these ethico-political conceptions emphasize virtue, relationship, and 
embodiment, and thereby the embodied axes of race, gender, and sex. The latter, in turn, are 
central to both social justice and the popular arts on which social justice powerfully and 
captivatingly draws, including dance. Channeling this connection, the present investigation 
reinterprets four of Heller’s ethical-political conceptions of justice from the history of 
philosophy, as choreographed duets between the partners of the ethical and political, which I 
term “ethico-political choreographies of justice.”  
First, I rehearse my dance-resonant conception of social justice (as “organismic 
empowerment”) and my interpretive method of “dancing-with,” in preparation for applying them 
to my four choreographies, in historical order. Among my reasons for this organization is that, as 
Judith Hamera recently demonstrated, for choreography too (as for philosophy), technique is 
centrally concerned with the binding of the community through historical time.5 Second, I begin 
applying dancing-with, whose explicit goal is what I call “poetic social justice,” to my founding 
ethico-political choreography of justice, in Plato’s Republic and Phaedrus, where he stages the 
 
4 See Agnes Heller, Beyond Justice (New York: Blackwell, 1990). In support of her own extension of the ethical to 
the political in Justice and the Philosophy of Difference, Iris Marion Young affirms Heller’s “ethico-political concept 
of justice,” and her claim that “justice is primarily the virtue of citizenship” (33). Iris Marion Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
5 A central theoretical term for Hamera, she describes “technique” as “a pre-existing conversation between bodies, 
history, and desire,” used by members of the community “to build diverse and compelling communities within the 
larger global city.” Just so, I will be exploring here the evolution of techniques for justice, as handed down from 
Plato, to his student Aristotle, to the most important Arab interpret of them, and to the contemporary philosopher 
who advocates a return to this tradition of ethico-political conceptions of justice. Judith Hamera, Dancing 
Communities: Performance, Difference and Connection in the Global City (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4. 
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just community as a Dionysian choral dance of chariot souls, winged by their erotic ethical 
education. Third, I explore the uptake of Plato’s choreographic technique in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, which (for dancing-with) valorizes what I term “equitable-justice” over 
“lawful-justice,” where the former is understood as a beautiful friendship with the community. 
Fourth, I turn to the philosopher whom the medievals called “the Second teacher” (after 
Aristotle), Alfarabi’s Virtuous Community, which (for dancing-with) presents justice as a 
tightrope-dance in which the imagination regulates the body’s temperature, for establishing the 
soul’s virtue of temperance, for sustaining a coolly-just community. Fifth, I consider Iris Marion 
Young’s recuperation of Heller’s ethico-political conceptions of justice in the present, and her 
dance-like reimagining of humans as positioned actors in fluidly moving groups. Finally, 
synthesizing these analyses yields what I call “dancing justice,” defined as the dynamic 
equilibrium sustained by a critical mass of a community’s members comporting themselves like 
dancers at a social dance. The inspiring and paradigmatic example of such social dance, for me, 
is the Afro-Latin social dance known as salsa, as I have explored in detail elsewhere, and to 
which I will return in the conclusion. 
 
I. Organismic Empowerment through Dancing-with 
My new conception of social justice as organismic empowerment consists of a bottom-
up, grassroots activity, wherein each organism is enabled to engage in transformative, self-
cultivating flourishing (as opposed to a top-down, centralized imposition on passive individuals). 
On this view, social justice is, more precisely, an intuitive maximization of one’s being as a 
mode or stylization of the cosmos (from Spinoza), which maximization erupts in a self-
Hall 5 
transformation (from Nietzsche), which self-transformation converts the literal muscular tension 
of oppressed group members into liberating art (from Fanon).  
To flesh out this conception, social justice as organismic empowerment involves (1) a 
knowledge of the universal via the particular, (2) which knowledge is utilized to overcome the 
self in favor of empowerment per se, (3) which overcoming results in a turning of oppression’s 
tensions against its own forces and institutions. The implications of this three-part process are 
that (1) universality shines fully through each being, (2) living beings naturally seek 
empowerment rather than a mere continuance of living, and (3) even the most seemingly 
apolitical movements of artistic expression involve tensions that can nevertheless be repurposed 
for liberation. All three aspects of this definition, moreover, are consistent with the 
abovementioned discussion of the emphasis in social justice advocacy of the arts and aesthetics. 
On my reading, the best vehicle for Spinoza’s intuition is poetry, especially dramatic poetry 
when performed; Nietzsche’s fullest treatment of “self-overcoming” is found in his prose poem 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, specifically in a section that is centrally concerned with dance; and 
Fanon directly links tension to art via his concept of “combat literature.”6  
This aesthetic dimension, though mostly implicit in social justice as organismic 
empowerment, manifests in the very name of my interpretive method, “dancing-with.” In brief, 
dancing-with is the strategic, creative reinterpretation of canonical historical philosophers, 
whereby one comports oneself toward them as dance partners, in a posited shared pursuit of the 
community artwork that is social justice. More precisely, this method consists of four strategic 
postings, by the interpreting theorist, of four corresponding virtues, in the interpreted theorist. In 
brief, these four positings and four virtues involve interpreting theorists as having torsioned their 
 
6 See Joshua M. Hall, “Revalorized Black Embodiment: Dancing with Fanon,” Journal of Black Studies 43(3): 2012, 
274-288. 
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views in pursuit of justice in their own sociohistorical contexts, and as preferring that we 
creatively reinterpret them in order to continue their (posited) support for social justice in our 
own sociohistorical context. It also requires us to open ourselves to the truths in historical 
theorists that challenge our present-day assumptions and biases. 
To flesh out this method, the interpreting theorist posits that the interpreted theorist is 
sufficiently (1) just to prioritize social justice, (2) imaginatively farsighted to see the need for 
creative reinterpretation, (3) flexible to adapt theory to new facts, and (4) wise to see things that 
are now difficult to affirm in the interpreter’s historical era. And in pursuit of this positing, the 
virtues required of the interpreter are (1) moral imagination in order to imaginatively occupy the 
interpreted theorist’s embodied position and thereby sympathize with their ends, (2) courage in 
order to read historical theorists against the grain of present-day fads, (3) trust in order to believe 
the historical theorist hypothetically willing to their views given present-day facts, and (4) 
flexibility in order to remain open to the possibility that the interpreter’s culture’s assumptions 
about some of the interpreted theorist’s claims might be wrong. 
 
II. Plato’s Dancing Chorus of Winged Souls 
 Having identified the goal of the present investigation (social justice as organismic 
empowerment) and the method of interpretation (dancing-with), I now turn to my first ethico-
political choreography of justice. For Plato, I begin with the obvious location source in his 
corpus, namely the Republic. As indicated by the title of Eric Brown’s Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry on “Plato’s Ethics and Politics in the Republic,” the dialogue’s primary subject 
is ethics, specifically the classic Ancient Greek virtue of justice.7 The reason why the dialogue 
 
7 Brown, Eric, "Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/plato-ethics-politics. 
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detours to the political state, at least according to the character of Socrates, is that the complex 
concept of justice is easier to analyze in its larger form, as a structure of the city.  
Though the Republic is famously critical of much (dramatic and epic) poetry, there are 
several factors that mitigate and even reverse this judgment. First, Plato was a tragic poet before 
meeting Socrates. Second, in his dialogue entitled the Laws, Plato openly affirms not only 
poetry, but also poetry’s role in the best possible city, and the poetic nature of philosophy. In 
fact, the Laws’ interlocutors explicitly call themselves “poets” and their proposed laws “poetry.” 
Moreover, as I have explored in detail elsewhere, the centerpiece of the Laws’ proposed laws is 
an educational curriculum founded on dance education.8 And third, this poetic affirmation is 
further manifested in Plato’s deployment, in the Republic and other dialogues, of the formal 
poetic technique known as “conceit.” Also known as “extended metaphor,” a conceit is a 
sustained comparison of two things that links various features of one thing (the metaphor) to the 
other (the literal object).  
In the Republic, Plato’s conceit is city-justice as soul-justice. And in the Phaedrus, which 
like the Republic explores the soul through indirection, Plato’s conceit is of the soul as a winged 
chariot-team. One benefit of recognizing the conceit of the Republic is that it recasts Plato’s 
apparent endorsements of totalitarianism, artistic censorship, a rigid caste system, and a life of 
apolitical quietism for the best philosopher. Instead, these features all part of Plato’s poetic 
conceit, wherein reason (nous) is the “guardian” of the soul, controlling spiritedness (thymos) as 
the soul’s “auxiliary” powers, to protect desire (eros) as the soul’s “producer.” In other words, 
 
8 See Joshua M. Hall, “Positure in Plato’s Laws: An Introduction to Figuration on Civic Education,” Journal of Social 
Science Education 15(4): 2016, 59-67. 
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this conceit reveals that the Republic’s conception of the soul is isomorphic to that of the 
Phaedrus, with the latter’s conceit of the soul as winged chariot-team.9  
For anyone unfamiliar with the latter, the scholarly consensus on it is that the chariot’s 
“dark horse” represents the lowest/carnal aspect of soul, the “light horse” represents the 
middle/spirited aspect of soul, and the charioteer represents the highest/rational aspect of soul. 
Though the dark horse and its desire are often identified as eros, I follow scholars who interpret 
eros as distributed throughout the three parts/powers (which I prefer to translate as “carnal 
desire,” “societal desire,” and “mindful desire”).10 This is not to say, however, that Plato’s 
conception of justice is limited to the ethical or individual realm. On the contrary, I interpret this 
Phaedrus/Republic conception of soul as Plato’s grassroots agenda for creating a more just city, 
namely by helping people become more ethically just, as modeled by the character of Socrates.  
In support of this interpretation, Elizabeth Fiore’s bold new reading of the Phaedrus 
persuasively argues that its hyperborean procession of winged chariot-teams is in truth a 
Dionysian choral dance, with Socrates as a satyr playing the role of the erotic dark horse. In 
Belfiore’s words, “the dances performed by the soul-chariots are similar in many respects to the 
dithyramb.”11 Belfiore also buttresses my linkage of the Phaedrus and the Laws, which 
implicitly links both more closely to the Republic as well. More precisely, Belfiore fleshes out 
her analogy between the chariot procession and the dithyramb by noting the similarities between 
 
9 For more, see Joshua M. Hall, “Plato’s Phaedrus after Descartes’ Passions: Reviving Reason’s Political Force,” Lo 
Sguardo: Journal of Philosophy 27 (2019): 75-93. 
10 The most influential of these scholars is Ferrari. For two scholars who have followed in Ferrari’s interpretive 
wake, Schiltz and Budziszewska.  
11 Elizabeth Belfiore, “Dancing with the Gods: The Myth of the Chariot in Plato’s ‘Phaedrus’,” The American Journal 
of Philology 127, no. 2 (2006): 205. 
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the Phaedrus’ choral dance and the “Corybantic dances, the musical education of children, and 
the reeducation of older adults at symposia” in the Laws.12  
In short, Plato’s winged chariot souls pursue justice both ethically (for their three-part 
souls) and politically (for their dancing community). Each dancer in the group’s chorus only 
rises to the politics of the heavenly dance on the strength of their wing-inducing ethical 
interpersonal development with the lovers and beloveds. A more literal version on this ethical-
political ascent, moreover, is precisely what happens with Socrates’ interlocutors in the Republic, 
including the disordered “producer” soul of Cephalus, the disordered “auxiliary” soul of 
Thrasymachus, and the immature “guardian” souls of Glaucus and Adeimantus, who visibly 
progress in justice as the dialogue unfolds. Put in terms of the Phaedrus’ winged chariot-team 
souls, what the Republic stages is the ethical, interpersonal development of the interlocuters’ 
winged souls, and what it foreshadows is the political dance performed by the actual individuals 
historically fictionalized in the dialogues.   
  
III. Aristotle’s Dancingly Beautiful Friends of the Community 
In the previous section, I identified the core ethico-political choreography of justice, in 
Plato, as a Dionysian choral dance of chariot souls, winged by their erotic ethical education. I 
now turn to the most direct and influential inheritor of this choreographic technique for justice, 
Plato’s student Aristotle, in whom Plato’s choreography becomes helpfully more explicit. 
Aristotle repeatedly links ethics and politics in his conception of justice in the Nicomachean 
 
12 Belfiore, “Dancing with the Gods,” 207-208. She claims, more specifically, that children are like unruly dark 
horses who need to be disciplined into more orderly movement, “to learn to use their god-given perception of 
order and disorder so as to move in rhythm and sing in harmony”; as for the elderly, Belfiore sees them as 
comparable to the overly restrained light horses who need to be inspired with a bit of choreographed energy, 
“under the guidance of the sober symposiarch” (209-210).  
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Ethics (hereafter, Ethics), and links this ethico-political justice to aesthetics. Beginning with the 
ethics/politics linkage, Aristotle writes that (1) “it must not be forgotten that what is being sought 
is not only what is just simply but what is just in political life”; (2) his treatise in the Ethics “is in 
a certain way political”; (3) “a human being by nature is meant for a city”; and (4) a politician 
“wants to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.”13 In short, ethics assumes the politics 
of a specific city. (This linkage is further buttressed, as suggested by an early reviewer of this 
article, by Aristotle’s claim in Ethics Book I that politics is the master science). 
Turning to the Ethics’ related linkage between the ethicopolitical and aesthetics, Aristotle 
claims that (1) discourse about the “beautiful and justice” is identical to discourses that “pertain 
to political matters”; (2) a virtuous person is one who lives “beautifully”; (3) “one who does not 
delight in beautiful actions is not even a good person”; (4) “the beautiful” “is the end that 
belongs to virtue”; and (5) actions “in accord with virtue are beautiful and are for the sake of the 
beautiful” (NE 1095b, 1098a10, 1099a10, 1115b10, and 1120a20). In sum, as Joe Sachs 
observes in a footnote to his translation, Aristotle’s ethics assumes the politics of an Athenian 
aristocracy that referred to its members as “the beautiful and the good” (NE 1099a, n18, p. 13). 
In addition to these more obvious linkages among ethics, politics, and aesthetics, the 
Ethics offers an alternate conception of justice as equitability (or decency) in Book 8’s analysis 
of friendship and justice. The superiority of this conception, on my view, consists in its ethical 
and aesthetic richness. Before turning to the latter, however, I will first consider the Ethics’ first 
analysis of justice, from Book 5. At the outset of this discussion, Aristotle notes a slight 
ambiguity in the word “justice.” One meaning, he claims, is roughly synonymous to “equitable,” 
while the other approximates to “lawful” (NE, 1129b30). The former seems closer to ethics, 
 
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2002), 1134a20, 1049b, 1097b, 
1102a10. 
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while the latter seems closer to politics. It is this lawfulness-justice which, according to Aristotle, 
“often seems the greatest of the virtues,” and which “is complete virtue because it is the putting 
to use of complete virtue” (NE, 1129b30). By the phrase “putting to use of complete virtue,” 
Aristotle means applying the virtue indifferently, to anyone and everyone in the city. In short, 
(lawfulness) “justice, alone among the virtues, seems to be someone else’s good,” which makes 
it “not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue” (NE, 1130a, 1130a10).   
 This lawful dimension helps explain several otherwise counterintuitive aspects of 
Aristotle’s account of justice in Book 5. First, he traces the etymology of the word “just” 
(dikaion) to the word “halves” (dicha), meaning that the judge is the one who cuts things in half 
(to distribute the two halves to the competing parties in the community, according to dessert) 
(NE, 1132a30). This description seems better fitted to juridical justice than interpersonal ethical 
justice, in part because it recalls the sword-wielding Greek goddess of justice (and the famous 
story in the Tanakh of King Solomon threatening to cut a baby in half to determine its true 
mother).14 Second, Aristotle defines “what is just” as “a mean between doing injustice and 
having injustice done to one” (NE 1133b30). Such a mean, qua passive, seems to lack the 
Aristotelian virtue requirements of (a) being an active condition and (b) being a choice. Third, 
toward the end of Book 5, Aristotle distinguishes between “natural” and “conventional” justice, 
linking the former to the gods (among whom, he adds, “nothing changes at all,” including their 
divine justice) (NE, 1134b30). Finally, and relatedly, he closes Book 5 claiming that the “decent” 
(or “equitable”) is greater than justice, because equitability is “a setting straight of a law, insofar 
as [that law] leaves something out as a result of being universal” (NE, 1137b20).  
 
14 I Kings 3:16-28. 
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In sum, Aristotle’s lawfulness-justice, in this dancing-with interpretation, is only the sum 
of all virtues because it is constrained by a society’s imperfect and evolving laws. As Sachs 
observes in another footnote, “The heavily mathematical treatment of justice up to this point 
omits any reference to the beautiful,” which omission “suggests that justice is in some way an 
incomplete, or undeveloped virtue” (NE, 1134a, translator’s footnote). Sachs see this point as a 
foreshadowing of friendship in Book 8, where Aristotle implies that a superior form of justice 
involves the threads left behind earlier in the Ethics—including justice’s equitable, natural, and 
divine forms. From this perspective of dancing-with, one could say that Aristotle divides justice 
into two sets of halves, and the better half of each pair is close to friendship. The connection to 
dance, on this subject, is that a group of people united by friendship is more suggestive of a 
community of dancers than of an impersonal group of citizens. 
 Returning to Book 8’s alternate conception of justice, in its first chapter Aristotle 
observes that “lawmakers seem to take” friendship “more seriously than justice” (NE, 1155a30). 
For one thing, he observes, legislators seek above all to “banish faction,” which is the opposite of 
“like-mindedness,” and the latter state is “similar to friendship” (NE, 1155a30). Aristotle later 
buttresses this point with the claim that “like-mindedness seems to be friendship in a political 
sense” (1167b). Furthermore, even when people “are just there is still need for friendship” (NE, 
1155a30). Finally, regarding whatever pertains to justice, he observes that whatever “inclines 
toward friendship seems to be the most just of all” (NE, 1155a30). Aristotle returns to this point 
in detail Chapter 9, with the following three claims: (1) to “share something in common” defines 
both friendship and justice; (2) “friendship consists in community”; and (3) friendship and 
justice “are present in the same things and have an equal extent” (NE, 1159b30, 1160a).  
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This “equal” rhetoric is close to “equitable” (via “equal,” ίσος), and thus recalls 
Aristotle’s earlier reference to equitability-justice. Considering these two discussions together, I 
interpret Book 8’s friendship-like justice as identical for Aristotle to Book 5’s equitability-
justice, which suggests the possibility, for a dancing-with interpretation, that equitability-justice 
might be superior to lawfulness-justice. More precisely, equitable-justice could be understood as 
superior to lawfulness-justice, to the same degree that friendship is superior to (lawfulness) 
justice. Put formulaically, equitability-justice = lawfulness-justice + equitability. In short, the 
equitably-just person might be helpfully understood as a friend to the community. 
Finally from the Ethics, since Aristotle links equitability, qua virtue, to art, aesthetics, and 
beauty—as I have elaborated in detail elsewhere—the equitable-just could be compared for him 
to fine artists, including dancers.15 Anticipating my language of dancing justice in the 
conclusion, this equitable artistry makes Aristotelian justice the kind of beautiful friendship that 
flows between all the members of a social dance group, coursing indifferently toward each 
dancer and the group itself, irrespective of the friendship, apathy, or antipathy obtaining between 
any two dancers. In short, Aristotelian justice, for dancing-with, means to be a dancingly 
beautiful friend to the entire community, for the sake of all. 
Compared to conventional friendship, this Aristotelian political friendship involves less 
warmth, and thus could be understood as a kind of “cool” or “temperate” friendship. The word 
 
15 More specifically, I explore how poesis functions—in On Generation and Corruption, the Physics, and On the 
Soul—primarily in the following ways: (1) as “making” or “postulating,” particularly in terms of what a theorist 
posits as the fundamental layer of reality; (2) as “activity,” particularly in relation to how the basic material 
elements of reality act on each other, as well as the soul understood as the activating verb to the body’s noun; and 
(3) as an aesthetic test of philosophical fitness via the poetic aspects of language. My conclusion is that these 
different aspects of the word poesis constitute aspects of a unified conception, which means that poesis qua 
activity in these three texts could also be thought of as a kind of poetry, more precisely the dynamic dancing basis 
of Aristotle’s materialist philosophy. For more, see Joshua M. Hall, “Core Aspects of Dance: Aristotle on Positure.” 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 53(1): 2019, 1-16. 
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“temperate” recalls the related ancient Greek virtue sophrosyne, often translated into English as 
“temperance,” but which I translate more freely here (following the dancing-with method) as 
“mind-saving.” (The word syne means a state of being, and sophros is composed of so, the root 
of soter (meaning “savior”) and phren (meaning “mind/soul”). In this light, sophrosyne keeps 
things moderate and balanced, leaving the person equally free to move in any direction, and thus 
empowers the soul to act. Temperance thus connects to justice, in that equitable-just folks have a 
calm, cool, and balanced way of comportment, which enables them to rationally assess any 
dispute and determine the best way to interact with all involved. Not coincidentally, this is 
exactly the view of the “Second Teacher” after Aristotle, Abu Nasr Alfarabi. 
 
IV. Alfarabi’s Tightrope-Dancers of the Cool 
At this moment in the history of this choreographic technique, justice consists of a 
Dionysian choral dance of chariot souls, winged by their erotic ethical education (from Plato) 
who are bound by beautiful friendship to the community (from Aristotle). This is the inheritance 
on which Alfarabi proceeds to build, including through his magnum opus. Usually rendered in 
English as On the Perfect State, I translate it more literally as The Principles of the Opinions of 
the Virtuous Community. For readers unfamiliar with medieval Arabic philosophy, especially 
given the veil of Islamophobia that shadows Western perceptions today, I realize that it may be 
difficult to accept how original and progressive Alfarabi. As an ethnically Turkish philosopher, 
Alfarabi lived in the cosmopolitan city of Baghdad in the tenth century, in the Golden Age of 
Islam, whose achievements included psychiatric hospital and music therapy for psychosocial 
dysfunction (of which Alfarabi was an advocate).16 For more on his groundbreaking work and 
 
16 For more, see Karim Mithra, “Conceptualising and addressing mental disorders amongst Muslim communities: 
Approaches from the Islamic Golden Age,” Transcultural Psychiatry 57, no. 6: 763-774. 
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contemporary relevance, including his critique of Islamic imperialism and championing of 
democracy and religious tolerance and pluralism, the reader is encouraged to consult the exciting 
work of Christopher Colmo, Joshua Parens, and Muhammad Ali Khalidi.17 
As I have explored in detail elsewhere, Alfarabi argues there that a just community 
requires souls possessing the virtue of temperance, which in turn requires bodies that maintain a 
literally cool temperature.18 Anticipating dancing justice, I imagine this temperate comportment 
as the balancing act of a tightrope walker, the German term for which translates literally as 
“rope-dancer,” weaving between the heat of intimate love and the coldness of hostile 
indifference to suffering strangers. And the phrase “of the cool” is an allusion to Robert Farris 
Johnson’s classic study of Africana aesthetics, Aesthetic of the Cool, which traces the history of a 
Nigerian philosophy of calm and balanced perseverance through adversity. The relevance of the 
German and Nigerian contexts here is that they emphasize the trans-cultural and trans-linguistic 
relevance of this connection between temperature, temperament, and dance. 
Alfarabi’s analysis of this dancing cool temperament relies on his own version of Plato’s 
poetic conceit. In Alfarabi’s case, this takes the form of extended analogies among the body, the 
soul, the community, and the cosmos. To elaborate, in each case a primary ruler provides the 
material resources for a secondary ruler (or representative) to rationally direct. More precisely, 
the heart provides heat for the body, which the brain distributes to the rest of the organs. The 
imagination provides the soul with images, which reason manipulates to control the movements 
of the body. The mythical “first ruler” provides the credibility that the actual ruler channels into 
 
17 See, for example, Christopher Colmo, Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington, 
2005); Joshua Parens, An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005); and Muhammad Ali 
Khalidi, “Al-Farabi on the Democratic City,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11, no. 3 (2003). 
18 See Joshua M. Hall, “Alfarabi’s Imaginative Critique: Overflowing Materialism in Virtuous Community,” The South 
African Journal of Philosophy 34(2): 2015, 175-192. 
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their governing practices for the community. And the “First” existent is a mere figurehead for the 
constant material activity of the cosmos’ evolving self-unfolding. Put differently, the First is the 
static image or representation for the dynamic forces of the cosmos. When the community’s 
bodies are temperate enough for their souls to be temperate enough to mirror the natural 
temperance of the cosmos, then the community will be just.19 
Alfarabi’s argument here, in anticipation of dancing justice’s emphasis on art, aesthetics 
and embodiment, implies an important role for the imagination, as the power that strides the 
divide between the body/perception and mind/reason. More precisely, the imagination forms 
images of things to motivate the body to seek and acquire a healthier temperature. For example, 
when the body gets physically wet, the imagination’s temperament does not imitate that wetness 
by itself getting wet, but rather by producing imagery suggestive of moisture, such as “water and 
swimming” (PS, 213). And at the community level, these images can also be artistically 
externalized and circulated to regular the average temperatures, and thereby temperament, of the 
community as required for justice. Put in the cognitive science terms of Antonio Damasio 
(indebted to Spinoza, who was himself indebted to Alfarabi by way of Maimonides), the body 
must maintain homeostasis if it is to function, including imaginatively, and for that reason 
consciousness is an evolutionary tool for maintaining said homeostasis.20  
 
19 More precisely, in their respective regulatory roles, the brain’s job is to keep the body from overheating, 
reason’s job is to keep the soul from metaphorically “overheating” through an unrestrained and overactive 
imagination, and the actual ruler’s job is to prevent the community’s beliefs (including in the first ruler) from 
becoming an overzealous neglecting of this world. For more on this relationship, see Alfarabi, On the Perfect State, 
173, 175, and 227. 
20 Antonio Damasio, The Strange Order of Things: Life, Feeling, and the Making of Cultures (New York: Vintage, 
2018). 
Hall 17 
In sum, the imagination artfully shapes bodies into an ethico-politically just community. 
Evidence for this power of the imagination can be found in the following passage, where 
Alfarabi claims that the imagination:  
stirs the organs, which have [a given] function, to be prepared for [that function], not as a 
result of a desire which actually occurs at that moment but because the faculty of 
imagination imitates the desire through the actions which are usually connected to that 
desire (PS 219). 
One could interpret this passage as claiming that imagination’s imitating of past sense-
perceptions (by means of images) actually precedes the activity of the desiring power—and that 
imagination can thus cause actions without recourse to any desire whatsoever. That is, one can 
(at least in certain circumstances) first imagine something, and then afterwards desire it (instead 
of the other way around), especially if the causal image is well-crafted. This insight anticipates 
critical theory’s analysis of the desire-fabricating powers of the culture industry. In the latter, 
too, imaginative works (such as television commercials) create desires which did not previously 
exist for consumers. Contrarily, and returning to my previous point, the imagination for Alfarabi 
could also therefore positively and constructively shape community members toward justice. 
 With this overview of Alfarabi’s argument in mind, I now offer a close reading of a few 
of its most salient moments in Virtuous Community. Justice is first named in Chapter 2, Section 
2, in the section on the cosmos. Alfarabi describes “the First” as just, specifically insofar as 
“each existent receives from the First its allotted share of existence in accordance with its rank” 
(PS, 97). That is, the First emanates its essence to each existent exactly in accordance with the 
existent’s relative merits; it is the perfect distributor of being. Justice’s second appearance in 
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Virtuous Community also concerns the cosmos. In Chapter 9, Section 1, Alfarabi articulates what 
I have elsewhere termed “natural distributive justice.” In Alfarabi’s words,  
it is natural for matter to have one form, as to have its contrary, each of these bodies has a 
rightful claim to its form and a rightful claim to its matter. Its right by virtue of its form is 
to remain in the existence which it has, and its right by matter is to assume another 
existence contrary to the existence which it has. But since it cannot achieve these two 
contrary modes of existence simultaneously, it follows by necessity that it achieves the 
one mode for a time and the other mode for a time (PS, 145). 
Note his remarkable conclusion. Evolution and history are logically necessary if the cosmos is to 
be understood as fundamentally just. Alfarabi scholar Richard Walzer concurs, observing that 
“‘justice’ is very important for Alfarabi when he deals with the sublunary world.”  
Evidence of this affirmation of evolution can be found in Alfarabi’s materialist account 
of species generation via the mixtures of basic elements. More precisely, this “mixture” for 
Alfarabi amounts to combinations of fire, air, earth, water and the bodies that “arise” from these 
elements, namely minerals, plants, non-speaking-thinking animals and speaking-thinking 
animals. “Man alone,” he concludes, “arises as the result of the last mixture” (PS, 141). Thus, 
even the highest (and the only rational) being on earth, according to Alfarabi, is the product of 
brute matter in physical combination. In support of this anticipation of scientific materialism, 
Alfarabi a few pages later observes that matter “rises up gradually until its form becomes present 
in it” (PS, 145). This wording is significant insofar as it suggests a greater degree of agency for 
matter than the archetypical Aristotelian example (namely a wooden bed). In particular, 
Alfarabi’s adverb “gradually” puts a strain on a purely metaphorical reading of matter’s rising. 
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Thus, for a second time in this book Alfarabi attributes an independent principle of self-motion 
to matter itself. 
 Turning from the cosmos to the body and soul, Alfarabi’s discussion of the latter is also 
replete with the rhetoric of justice, including his description of the human heart as the “ruler” of 
the body, and of the brain as its “steward” and “representative” (PS, 169). More specifically, 
Alfarabi describes the brain as redistributing the heart’s heat to the rest of the organs, so that 
each organ gets what it deserves, as determined by its excellence-based rank in the body’s 
hierarchy. In his words, “the brain was for this purpose “made cool and moist by nature, and a 
faculty of the soul was established in it by which a definite and complete adjustment of the heat 
of the heart is brought about” (PS, 181, emphasis added). In other words, reason is corporeally 
situated in the (temperature) cool brain, which can cool the body enough for a (temperament) 
cool soul, which is thereby able to perform the rational calculations necessary for a (justice) cool 
community. Put differently, channeling Damasio again, disordered bodies, deprived of 
equilibrium, lack the homeostatic powers necessary for psychological equilibrium, and thereby 
the ethico-political virtue of as justice. In short, from this dancing-with perspective, the healthy 
body, virtuous soul, and just community are all tightrope dancers between the destructive 
excesses of literal or figurative excessive heat and cold. 
 Also regarding bodily and social justice, Alfarabi claims that there is a natural 
distribution of mental powers irrespective of gender, a surprising claim given his fundamentalist 
cultural context and his Aristotelian inheritance. In Alfarabi’s words, “in the case of the faculty 
of sense, the faculty of imagination and the faculty of reason male and female do not differ” (PS, 
197). But Alfarabi goes still further, in what today might be called a queering of this gendered 
psychology. It is possible, he asserts, “that there are among male human beings some whose 
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emotions are similar to female emotions, and among female human beings, some whose 
emotions are similar to male emotions” (PS, 195–197). One could describe this conception as a 
naturally just distribution of stereotypical masculinity and femininity, recognized as potentially 
obtaining in any body regardless of gender. The connection to dance, here, is that the latter is the 
artform that most foregrounds embodiment, including gender, and in the form of social dances 
(such as salsa) it also presupposes a certain degree of gendered equality. 
More precisely, this deconstruction, or gender-queering, is also common in present-day 
Afro-Latin social dance events, where conventional gender roles, identities, and performances 
are much less common, and deviance and innovation are welcome. This gendered flexibility is 
arguably a source of strength and resilience, a channeling of the Alfarabian natural distributive 
justice that normally eludes human communities. Put differently, Alfarabi’s just community is 
like a group of tightrope-dancers, balancing on a fine wire in the midst of a broken society, to 
maintain enough composure and cool to move and be beautifully together. The significance of 
invoking Alfarabi on this point is that the progressive goals of contemporary social justice are 
more common, historically, that one might imagine. That which keeps dancers suspended over 
the abyss, in any era, is the same thing that makes them beautiful to watch—and even more 
beautiful to dance with, as in a dancing partnership with my last philosopher, Iris Marion Young. 
 
V. Young’s Dancing Reimaging of Positioned Actors in Fluidly Moving Groups 
The history of this technique is almost complete. As Young inherits it, this ethico-
political choreography of justice consists of a Dionysian choral dance of chariot souls, winged by 
their erotic ethical education, bound in beautiful friendship to the community, wherein they 
perform a tightrope-dance of imaginative regulation of bodily temperature, to establish the soul’s 
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virtue of temperance, thereby sustaining a coolly-just community. For Young’s part, the 
importance of dancing aesthetics to her conception of justice is suggested by the title of an 
anthology of her work—Dancing with Iris—several chapters of make that importance explicit. 
Additionally, Young is explicit that her philosophy originated, and remained grounded in, the 
corporeal politics of on-the-ground activism, such as protests and marches (including for women, 
LGBT+ folks, people of color). And dance is both the quintessential corporeal art (as noted 
above), as well as disproportionately linked to disempowered individuals and groups.21 
Beginning with the Dancing with Iris anthology, Michaele L. Ferguson’s chapter argues 
that Young’s method is to seek “resonance” among seekers of social justice, which Ferguson 
elaborates as locating “some common sound resonating in each of us,” which “generates 
vibrations, movement, and energy.”22 Bonnie Mann’s chapter argues that there is “a turn to the 
aesthetic in Young’s descriptions of female body experience, which disclose an imaginary 
domain” of gender.23 And pioneering dance studies scholar Susan Leigh Foster, in her chapter, 
claims that “Young’s theorization of a feminine physicality…provided a strong foundation for 
emerging studies in performance and corporeality,” which have shaped today’s dance studies.24 
This dancingly aesthetic dimension, as for Plato, Aristotle, and Alfarabi, is connected to 
Young’s ethico-political choreography of justice, which is most vivid in her Justice and the 
Politics of Difference. The ethical aspects of Young’s choreography are already suggested from 
 
21 For more, see Joshua M. Hall, 2012, Figuration: A New Philosophy of Dance. PhD dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, Nashville, USA. http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07192012-180322/. 
22 Ann Ferguson, “Resonance and Dissonance: The Role of Personal Experience in Iris Marion Young’s Feminist 
Phenomenology,” 66. 
23 Bonnie Mann, “Iris Marion Young: Between Phenomenology and Structural Injustice,” 82. 
24 Susan Leigh Foster, “Throwing Like a Girl, Dancing Like a Feminist Philosopher,” 69. 
Hall 22 
the beginning of her introduction. First, Young rejects any “truly universal and independent” 
theory of justice, on the dual grounds that this type of theory is “simply too abstract to be useful 
in evaluating actual institutions and practices,” and that it “conflates moral reflection with 
scientific knowledge.”25 (JPD, 4). Second, Young echoes Jean-François Lyotard’s call for a 
“listening” to justice (instead of merely looking at it), which requires the intimacy of ethics (as 
opposed to the distance of politics) (JPD, 4). Third, Young rejects “the ideal of impartiality” in 
mainstream theories of justice, claiming that it “denies difference,” whereas the opposite of 
impartiality, namely “partiality,” inevitably brings in the interpersonal, and thus ethics (JPD, 10). 
Finally on this point, Young claims inspiration (in her words, “ignition”) from the ethical realm 
of interpersonal dialogue about politics, specifically “discussions in the women’s movement of 
the importance and difficulty of acknowledging differences of class, race, sexuality, age, ability, 
and culture among women” (JPD, 13). In other words, Young allowed ethical conflicts among 
her allies to restructure her initial politics. 
 Continuing to Chapter 1 of Justice, ethics remains close to the surface throughout, 
particularly in Young’s critique and rejection of what she identifies as the “distributive 
paradigm” dominant in mainstream theories of justice. First, she objects to William Galston’s 
conception of justice as merely the distribution of possessions, wherein “the possessing subject is 
prior to and independent of the goods possessed” (JPD, 17). Second, Young identifies a “social 
atomism” in these theories, specifically in their view that “there is no internal relation among 
persons in society relevant to considerations of justice” (JPD, 18). Third, Young echoes the 
feminist criticism that Marxist theories typically “presuppose family structure, without asking 
how social relations involving sexuality, intimacy, childrearing, and household labor ought best 
 
25 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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to be organized” (JPD, 21). And fourth, Young objects that the distributive paradigm fails to 
theorize “culture,” which she describes as “the symbols, images, meanings, habitual 
comportments, stories, and so on through which people express their experience and 
communicate with each other” (JPD, 23). Clearly, all four of these phenomena involve ethics as 
well as politics. 
 Near the end of Chapter 1, Young explicitly acknowledges this ethical emphasis and 
traces its indebtedness to a cluster of ancient and medieval ethico-political conceptions of justice, 
as follows: 
Political thought of the modern period greatly narrowed the scope of justice as it had 
been conceived by ancient and medieval thought. Ancient thought regarded justice as the 
virtue of a society as a whole, the well-orderedness of institutions that foster individual 
virtue and promote happiness and harmony among citizens (JPD, 33). 
Note that Young frames politics here as a kind of macro-ethics, or what might be termed an 
extension of modern ethical predicates to cover sociopolitical entities. “While I hardly intend to 
revert to a full-bodied Platonic conception of justice,” Young elaborates, “I nevertheless think 
that it is important to broaden the understanding of justice beyond its usual limits in 
contemporary philosophical discourse” (JPD, 33). Further fleshing out her predecessor Plato’s 
ethico-political choreography of justice, Young affirms that “appeals to justice” in his wake “still 
have the power to awaken a moral imagination” (JPD, 35).  
The latter phrase brings Young closer to my dancing justice, and at multiple levels. For 
one thing, it introduces an aesthetic dimension to her conception of justice. For another, it also 
constitutes one of what I term the “four strategic positings” of my “dancing-with” interpretive 
method. Young also prefigures my postmodern-influenced dancing justice with her affirmation 
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of “a postmodern turn to an enlarged conception of justice” (JPD, 36). Most importantly, Young 
defends justice theorists’ positing of a new “image” of “human nature,” in order to (a) “shift the 
imagination to different assumptions about human beings,” and (b) shift the imagination away 
from the assumptions of the distributive paradigm. While the latter paradigm imagines humans 
as merely “possessors and consumers,” Young recommends, in addition, an “image of people as 
doers and actors” (JPD, 37). Since “actors” is an ambiguous term, which can refer to both 
initiators of actions and to thespians, who are also typically trained in and perform dance, 
Young’s image is also a tentative first step toward dance, prefiguring other steps (as noted above 
from Dancing with Iris). 
Finally from Young’s Justice, the beginning of Chapter 2 introduces her concept of 
“social group,” which implicitly choreographs the duet between ethics and politics in her 
conception of justice. The external referents of “social group” for Young here are the 
subcommunities whose historical struggle for social justice first inspired her, including African 
Americans, Latinx people, women, and queer and disabled folks. Young defines “social group” 
in Justice as “a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural 
forms, practices, or way of life,” the members of which collectives “have a specific affinity with 
one another because of their similar experience or way of life” (JPD, 43). The ethical-political 
choreographing performed by the phenomenon of the social groups can be found in the fact that 
they are both the primary intermediate power between the individual and the state (and are thus 
political), and also necessarily constituted by interpersonal relations (and are thus ethical). 
Young then clarifies her conception of “social groups” by differentiating them from both 
“aggregates” and “associations,” with which mainstream justice theorists, in her view, have 
confused social groups. Whereas aggregates are based on a shared attribute (for example, 
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possessing a PhD), Young claims that there is no attribute or set of attributes shared by every 
member of a social group (JPD, 43). And whereas associations are “formally organized 
institutions,” Young claims here that groups are based on internal relations of identity and 
interpersonal relationships (though she retracts this view in her later work).26 Social dance meets 
these distinguishing criteria as well. Social dancers do not constitute aggregates because we lack 
any necessary attributes. And we do not constitute association, because we can always move 
from one event, organization, and city to another (where we interact with a completely different 
set of individual dancers). 
Fleshing out her conception further, Young observes that groups (a) share “a sense of 
identity,” (b) are real “as forms of social relations,” (c) “constitute individuals” (instead of being 
constituted by pregiven individuals), and (d) are something that “one finds oneself as a member 
of” (JPD, 44-46). To do justice to this metaphysical structure of groups, Young claims it is 
“necessary to conceptualize groups in a much more relational and fluid fashion,” including by 
noting that groups are “aspects of a process” (JPD, 47). All these characteristics are also vividly 
true of Afro-Latin social dancers, and to a greater degree than most groups. Not only are those 
dance events and communities exceptionally pluralistic in terms of class, education, race, gender, 
religion, politics, etc., but they involve the profound physical, psychological (and potentially 
romantic and sexual) vulnerability and transformation, including the facilitation of marriages and 
childbirths across racial, class, national, religious, and other taboo lines, which has long been 
 
26 It is worth nothing that, as Máriam Martínez observes, Young’s “notion of social group” is “one of the most 
controversial contributions of her work,” and that in her later Inclusion and Democracy the concept of social group 
possesses “an empirical character that empties the concept of any reference to identity.” Máriam Martínez, “On 
Immigration Politics in the Context of European Societies and the Structural Inequality Mode,” Dancing with Iris: 
The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young, edited by Ann Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 226. This evolution in Young’s conception does not, however, change its aptness for social dancers, 
since we can easily be defined by either identity or by empirical characteristics. 
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associated with the most progressive and revolutionary societal institutions. In short, social dance 
is maximally aesthetic, corporeal, spontaneous self-overcoming and community reconstruction.  
This dancing quality of justice in Justice grows even stronger in Young’s posthumously 
published book on justice, entitled Responsibility for Justice (hereafter, Responsibility). This 
strength is nowhere clearer than in her concept of “position.” In addition to the obvious 
connection to the classic five “positions” of ballet, position is also closely linked to “positure,” 
one of the four central aspects of dance, or “Moves,” in my Figuration philosophy of dance. Not 
only is position one of the most important concepts in Responsibility, but it also links its concept 
of justice to major influences on Young (including Pierre Bourdieu), and it is vital for 
choreographing her duet between the ethical and political dimensions of justice (despite her 
attempts in that text to divide ethical and political responsibility). In other words, the conceptual 
positions of justice begin with the literal poses and postures of the body, which are always with 
us, and which dance in unique in recognizing, empowering, and rendering mindful. 
Position first appears in Responsibility in the hypothetical story of Sandy the would-be 
renter, in Young’s explanation of how structural injustice, contra conservative critics, still leaves 
room for individual agency and ethical responsibility. “Structures describe a set of socially 
caused conditions,” Young writes, “that position a large number of people in similar ways.”27 
Nevertheless, she adds, “each person so positioned is responsible for how she or he takes up 
these conditions.”28 Put in the terms of ethico-political choreography, political structures create 
ethical positions of varying vulnerability and empowerment. Moreover, as the argument of 
Responsibility unfolds, Young extends the meaning of “position” in a way that illuminates the 
 
27 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19, emphasis original. 
28 Ibid, 19. 
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implicit ethico-political choreography of justice beneath her conscious attempt to separate ethical 
and political responsibility. “The social positions of class and gender,” Young asserts, “explain 
much about Sandy’s circumstance.”29 In other words, Sandy is not simply an individual 
unmarried working mom; she is also a member of gendered and raced social groups. Position 
thus connects to both the individual (ethical) and the social (political).  
In short, and to conclude this penultimate section, position is always both ethical and 
political, just like justice, and dance. Moreover, dance is unique among the arts in recognizing 
the centrality and corporeal foundation of position, and thereby singularly positioned to provoke 
transformations in our philosophical conceptions, including that of justice. Alongside the 
imaginative aesthetic richness of Young’s work noted by the contributors to Dancing with Iris, 
such as her strategic deployment of the imagination to style human beings as essentially actors, 
this emphasis on the positions of group members makes Young’s final conception of justice 
highly compatible with my dancing justice, which it prefigures, and to which I now turn. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Dancing Justice 
Choreographing together the above analyses, I define “dancing justice” as follows: “the 
dynamic equilibrium sustained by a critical mass of a community’s members comporting 
themselves like social dancers.” My privileged referents for “social dancers” here are people who 
consistently participate, over a long period of time, in Afro-Latin social dance events (or 
“socials”), which are typically held in bars, restaurants, or professional dance studios/schools, 
both regularly (usually at least weekly) and for an extended time (usually years or even decades). 
These dance events normally take place in city spaces, and (to repeat) feature a wide 
 
29 Ibid, 59. 
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demographic variety, in terms of class, education, race, gender, religion, politics, etc., which 
means that they are much more representative than one might imagine of the larger community. 
As such, they tend to foster groups that are surprisingly representative of their surrounding 
communities. And by “critical mass,” I intend an allusion to Black sociologist Patricia Hill 
Collins’ claim that sustainable progressive politics neither requires the participation of all or 
most of a community, nor can be achieved by an isolated leader, but instead involves an 
(indeterminate) percentage of like-minded people in the community working in concert.30 In 
sum, dancing justice happens when a critical portion of society dances their lives. 
Put in terms dancing justice’s four prefiguring ethico-political choreographies of justice, 
these social dancers, like Plato’s winged chariot souls, must first master an erotic ethics of self-
discipline to gain the full benefits of moving through politicized space. Like Aristotle’s 
dancingly beautiful friends of the community, these dancers must go beyond what public laws 
require, by treating all the dancers equitably and thereby being good friends to the community. 
Like Alfarabi’s tightrope-dancers of the cool, they must achieve this Aristotelian friendship of 
balanced coolness through their temperate bodies supporting souls with the temperament to 
constitute a just community. And like Young’s dancingly reimagined humans, they must sustain 
this community by reimagining humans as positioned actors in fluid moving groups.  
As with all four of these ethico-political choreographies of justice, dancing justice 
markedly emphasizes virtue and embodiment, leading to two major implications—which I 
imagine in the form of two choregraphed moves which both justice advocates and social justice 
advocates (both reformers and revolutionaries) should be willing and able to perform today. 
First, dancing justice is not the first theory of its ethico-politically choreographing kind, instead 
 
30 Patricia Collins, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice (University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 
242, 243. 
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finding existing movement vocabularies in its vaunted predecessors. (This first move should 
prove reassuring to the more centrist and traditionally inclined justice advocates, and is easily 
accessible to social justice advocates who are willing to do their share of historical research).  
Second, dancing justice maintains its connections to the movement patters of marginalized and 
disempowered groups. (This second move, which should reassure more leftist and social justice 
advocates, also hardly seems too much to ask of liberal justice advocates, too, since the latter at 
least pay lip service to promoting the welfare of those groups who have suffered the greatest 
injustices, both past and present). By rehearsing and performing the movement patterns of 
dancing justice, finally, justice and social justice advocates can achieve a more sharable set of 
comportments, a more unified choreography to move against our shared foes, the explicit 
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